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II.-31 
IS TROLLING TRUMP A RIGHT OR A 
PRIVILEGE?: THE ERRONEOUS FINDING 
IN KNIGHT FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTE 
AT COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY v. TRUMP 
Abstract: On May 23, 2018, in Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia 
University v. Trump, the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
New York considered whether the President of the United States violated the 
First Amendment rights of individuals by blocking them on Twitter. In doing so, 
the district court agreed with the plaintiffs’ allegations that blocking constituted 
impermissible viewpoint discrimination in the context of a public forum. Despite 
the long history of the public forum doctrine, the information age has presented 
new questions regarding the doctrine, and Knight First Amendment Institute 
marks the first instance in which a court identified a public forum within a public 
official’s twitter account. This Comment argues that application of the public fo-
rum doctrine to a portion of the President’s Twitter account was inappropriate. 
INTRODUCTION 
President Donald J. Trump is one of the first presidents to fully embrace 
Twitter as a means of communicating with the general public, which has 
stirred up considerable controversy.1 In Knight First Amendment Institute at 
Columbia University v. Trump, the United States District Court for the South-
ern District of New York considered whether the President can permissibly 
“block” a person from interacting with his Twitter account in response to criti-
cism expressed towards the President.2 The court answered no, finding that the 
portion of the President’s Twitter account in which users may interact with his 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Note, Recent Social Media Posts: Executive Power—Presidential Directives—In Tweets, 
President Purports to Ban Transgender Servicemembers, 131 HARV. L. REV. 934, 943 (2018) (dis-
cussing the controversy surrounding the legal status of President Trump’s tweets); RonNell A. Jones 
& Lisa G. Sun, Enemy Construction and the Press, 49 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1301, 1341–42 (2017) (discuss-
ing President Trump’s favoring of Twitter as a social media tool and concluding that his apparent 
decision that the media is no longer a necessary link to the public is a first in modern history); see also 
Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 
2018) (discussing President Trump’s use of Twitter to discuss and promote his policies and legislative 
agenda, to challenge and defend against media coverage of his presidency and for various governmen-
tal and non-government-related matters). Twitter is a social media platform that allows users to inter-
act with each other by posting short messages, known as “tweets.” Knight First Amendment Inst., 302 
F. Supp. 3d at 550. A user can respond to another user’s tweet by replying directly to that message 
with their own, which appears in a thread below the original tweet; by liking a tweet; or by “retweet-
ing” a tweet, which copies the tweet onto the responding user’s page. Id. at 550–51. 
 2 Knight First Amendment Inst., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 549. 
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tweets is a designated public forum, making blocking users in response to their 
political views a violation of the First Amendment.3 
This Comment argues that the court’s application of the public forum 
doctrine was inappropriate.4 Part I of this Comment provides an overview of 
the public forum doctrine and the factual and procedural background of Knight 
First Amendment Institute.5 Part II explains relevant case law involving the 
public forum doctrine and the court’s application of that doctrine to President 
Trump’s Twitter account.6 Part III argues that the court, in failing to consider 
the intricacies of the relevant case law, erred in finding President Trump’s 
blocking of other Twitter users unconstitutional.7 This error is especially prob-
lematic in light of increasing scholarly criticism of courts for applying the pub-
lic forum doctrine in an inconsistent, subjective manner that obscures the 
boundaries of the doctrine.8 The court’s application of the doctrine risks fur-
ther obscuration of these boundaries, will likely face criticism, and may con-
tribute to discouraging government officials from participating in social me-
dia.9 
I. PUBLIC FORUMS AND THE EXPANDING PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE 
Section A of this Part discusses various categories of public forums that 
the Supreme Court has identified.10 Section B then discusses application of the 
public forum doctrine and the legal framework for evaluating whether applica-
                                                                                                                           
 3 Id. at 549, 580. In doing so, the court rejected the “defendants’ contentions that the First 
Amendment does not apply in this case and that the President’s personal First Amendment interests 
supersede those of plaintiffs.” Id. at 549. 
 4 See infra notes 94–106 and accompanying text. 
 5 See infra notes 10–49 and accompanying text. 
 6 See infra notes 51–80 and accompanying text. 
 7 See infra notes 81–106 and accompanying text. 
 8 See Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When Speech Is Both Private and Governmental, 83 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 605, 677–78 (2008) (criticizing current categorization of government speech or public 
forum for being ad hoc in nature and prone to judicial bias); Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, 
The Many Faces of Government Speech, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1377, 1381, 1383 (2001) (striving to clarify 
the Supreme Court’s incoherent distinctions among the public forum doctrine and government 
speech); Ross Rinehart, Note, “Friending” and “Following” the Government: How the Public Forum 
and Government Speech Doctrines Discourage the Government’s Social Media Presence, 22 S. CAL. 
INTERDISC. L.J. 781, 811, 812 (2013) (criticizing the Court’s failure to provide sufficient clarity re-
garding the government speech doctrine and its contours). 
 9 See Rinehart, supra note 8, at 785 (arguing that “the imprecision and incompatibility of both the 
public forum and government speech doctrines to social media speech create significant uncertainty 
over government authority to regulate and maintain its own social media pages”); see also Nicholas 
Carr, Why Trump Tweets (And Why We Listen), POLITICO MAG. (Jan. 26, 2018), https://www.politico.
com/magazine/story/2018/01/26/donald-trump-twitter-addiction-216530 [https://perma.cc/7WEE-
EBMG] (“By blurring private and public discourse, Twitter allows Trump to turn locker-room talk, 
his favored idiom, into presidential speech.”). 
 10 See infra notes 13–23 and accompanying text. 
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tion is appropriate.11 Finally, Section C discusses the factual and procedural 
history of Knight First Amendment Institute.12 
A. Categories of Forums 
The Supreme Court has recognized three types of forums.13 The first cat-
egory is the traditional public forum, such as a street or park, held in trust for 
public use and used for assembly, communication, and discussion.14 The sec-
ond category, known as the designated public forum, consists of public proper-
ty that the government has opened for use by the public for expressive activi-
ty.15 The government creates this type of public forum by intentionally opening 
and designating a location or channel of communication for public discourse or 
other forms of expression, which it can limit to use for specified topics or by 
certain speakers.16 The final category is the nonpublic forum, which is simply 
public property that has not been designated for public expression either by 
way of tradition or government designation.17  
                                                                                                                           
 11 See infra notes 24–36 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 37–49 and accompanying text. 
 13 Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45–46 (1983); Make the Rd. by 
Walking, Inc. v. Turner, 378 F.3d 133, 142 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 14 Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45 (citing Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 
(1939)). In a traditional public forum, protection given to speech is at its peak, and the government can-
not alter the forum or restrict its use without completely changing the forum. Make the Rd., 378 F.3d at 
142. 
 15 Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677 (1998) (applying forum analysis 
to a televised candidate debate by a public television broadcaster); Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45–
46; Make the Rd., 378 F.3d at 142–43. 
 16 Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985) (applying forum analy-
sis to a charity drive organized in the federal workplace). For example, a state university with a policy 
of allowing students to use its meeting facilities had created a designated public forum and therefore 
could not restrict use of facilities based on viewpoint. Id. at 802–03 (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 
U.S. 263, 267 & n.5 (1981)); see Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45 (emphasizing that constitutional 
prohibitions on exclusion apply to a forum open to the general public, even when government was not 
required to create the forum) (first citing Widmar, 454 U.S. 263 (university meeting facilities); then 
citing City of Madison, Joint Sch. Dist. No. 8 v. Wis. Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976) 
(school board meeting); and then citing Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975) (munici-
pal theater)). 
 17 Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n, 523 U.S. at 678; Make the Rd., 378 F.3d at 143 (citing Gen. 
Media Commc’ns v. Cohen, 131 F.3d 273, 278 (2d Cir. 1997)). Examples of public property that 
courts have labeled nonpublic forums include a public broadcaster-sponsored televised debate, the 
United States Military Academy at West Point, public school mail systems, and city fire stations. 16A 
AM. JUR. 2d Constitutional Law § 543 (database updated Aug. 2018) (first citing Ark. Educ. Televi-
sion Comm’n, 523 U.S. at 666 (public broadcaster-sponsored televised debate among political candi-
dates); then citing Sussman v. Crawford, 548 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 2008) (the United States Military 
Academy at West Point); then citing Chiu v. Plano Indep. Sch. Dist., 260 F.3d 330 (5th Cir. 2001) 
(public school district’s mail delivery system); and then citing Parow v. Kinnon, 300 F. Supp. 2d 256 
(D. Mass. 2004) (city fire station)). 
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In a nonpublic forum, the government may regulate the time, place, and 
manner of use, and may act to prevent the use of the forum for any unintended 
purpose, so long as the actions are reasonable and not solely a result of oppos-
ing the expressed views.18 Within a traditional or designated public forum, pro-
tections apply to expressive activity such that viewpoint discrimination by a 
public official violates the First Amendment.19 Conduct comprises expressive 
activity when an actor performs it with an intent to convey some specific mes-
sage that those who perceive it are likely to understand.20 Viewpoint discrimi-
nation occurs whenever the government restricts expressive activity because of 
the expressed opinion, ideology, or perspective of the speaker.21 Outside of a 
public forum, a government official is permitted to discriminate against view-
points while engaging in government speech, which occurs when the govern-
ment wishes to speak on its own behalf.22 Government speech can take various 
forms, including through private individuals, but essentially applies when the 
government is speaking or conveying some message to the public.23 
B. Public Forum Analysis 
For public forum analysis to apply, the First Amendment must protect the 
speech at issue.24 An example of such protected speech is political speech, 
which includes any speech relating to governmental affairs, because protection 
of this speech was a core concern behind the founder’s enactment of the First 
                                                                                                                           
 18 Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 46. In evaluating whether excluding a particular type of speech is 
proper, courts distinguish between content discrimination, which a government official can engage in to 
confine the use of a forum to its intended purpose, and viewpoint discrimination, which is generally pro-
hibited where the speech is of the type that is ordinarily permitted within the forum. Rosenberger v. 
Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829–30 (1995) (citing Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 
U.S. at 46)). 
 19 Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 44–45. 
 20 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (citing Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 
410–11 (1974)) (holding that burning a flag on city streets is expressive conduct to which the First 
Amendment’s protections apply); John T. Haggerty, Note, Begging and the Public Forum Doctrine in 
the First Amendment, 34 B.C. L. REV. 1121, 1124 (1993) (discussing distinction between expressive 
conduct and ordinary conduct). 
 21 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829 (citing Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 46) (holding that a state 
university’s denial of Student Activities Funds to a Christian-affiliated student-run newspaper consti-
tuted unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination within a public forum). 
 22 Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2250 (2015) (classifying 
specialty license plates as government speech and stating that public forum analysis would be inappropri-
ate in that context); see United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 206, 208 (2003) (plurality 
opinion) (finding that a public library was not a public forum and that the library’s exercise of judg-
ment in blocking certain Internet content was constitutional). 
 23 See Rinehart, supra note 8, at 807 (citing Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 
(2001)) (explaining that the government speech doctrine applies when the government speaks directly 
to the public or when the government speaks through an individual to convey a message). 
 24 Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 797. 
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Amendment.25 In assessing whether it is proper to evaluate a space under the 
public forum doctrine, courts must first determine exactly what space the 
speaker wishes to access.26 When the access sought is relatively limited, as 
opposed to general, courts determine the forum’s borders in a more tailored 
manner, separating out the components of the property at issue so that the fo-
rum can be more precisely defined.27 For example, where plaintiffs wanted to 
access the advertising space on city buses, the forum analysis was confined to 
the advertising space, rather than the entire bus.28 
The defined space can only be subject to public forum analysis if the gov-
ernment maintains ownership or control over the property or space at issue, 
which may take the form of legal title to property or regulatory power over the 
property in the absence of legal ownership.29 Ownership or control can be used 
to discern whether state action exists, which is required for the First Amend-
ment to apply.30 In the absence of statutory or other legal authority granting a 
government official the power to exert control over the property, the govern-
ment is indistinguishable from a private property owner and state action does 
not exist.31 Despite its requisite nature, if a court initially determines that a fa-
                                                                                                                           
 25 See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 329 (2010) (declining to resolve a 
case in a manner that would chill political speech and emphasizing that the purpose of the First 
Amendment was largely to protect this speech); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218–19 (1966) (dis-
cussing consensus that a central purpose of the First Amendment was to protect discussion regarding 
governmental affairs and matters relating to political processes). 
 26 See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800 (directing that first step is to determine perimeters of forum). 
The court in Cornelius stated, “[A] speaker must seek access to public property or to private property 
dedicated to public use to evoke First Amendment concerns.” Id. at 801. 
 27 Id. at 801–02; see, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 46 (defining a school’s internal mail 
system, rather than the school as a whole, as the forum). To separate the components of the space at 
issue, courts identify the specific access sought and limit the forum to the area encompassing that 
access. Knight First Amendment Inst., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 565. 
 28 Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 299, 303 (1974); Knight First Amendment Inst., 
302 F. Supp. 3d at 565 (citing Lehman, 418 U.S. at 300–01). 
 29 See U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass’ns, 453 U.S. 114, 129 (1981) (indi-
cating that ownership or control is a threshold requirement for the First Amendment to guarantee 
access to government property); Knight First Amendment Inst., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 566 (identifying 
control or ownership as threshold requirement and listing various forms of ownership or control). The 
requisite control or ownership may be sufficient where the government maintains power to regulate or 
license the forum or its use. Int’l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 
(1992). Ownership or control over a property alone, however, does not create a public forum. U.S. 
Postal Serv., 453 U.S. at 129. 
 30 See Lehman, 418 U.S. at 303–04 (finding that, because state action exists, First Amendment re-
strictions apply); Halleck v. Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp., 882 F.3d 300, 307 (2d Cir. 2018) (explaining 
that First Amendment’s application depends on whether connection between actors and governmental 
authority is sufficient to establish that actors are state actors). 
 31 See Se. Promotions, 420 U.S. at 553 (“The restraints took a variety of forms, with officials exer-
cising control . . . under the authority of particular statutes. All, however, . . . gave public officials the 
power to deny use of a forum in advance of actual expression.”); see also Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 
836 (1976) (rejecting the notion that allowing the public to freely visit a place that the government owns 
or operates creates a public forum). Compare Halleck, 882 F.3d at 307 (finding state action where actors 
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cility or space is a public forum, which implies that the government operates 
that forum, the court usually will not separately identify state action.32 
After identifying the government-owned or controlled forum, courts typi-
cally determine what type of forum exists: a traditional public forum, a designat-
ed public forum, or a nonpublic forum.33 This often requires courts to discern 
government intent to create a forum.34 To determine intent, courts evaluate the 
government’s policy and practice and the nature of the property with regards to 
compatibility with expressive conduct or activity.35 Courts will not find this in-
tent where the official was instead engaged in government speech.36 
C. Factual and Procedural History of Knight First Amendment  
Institute at Columbia University v. Trump 
In Knight First Amendment Institute, the court considered whether the 
President can permissibly “block” a person from interacting with his Twitter 
account after that person has expressed criticism of the President.37 The plain-
tiffs, Rebecca Buckwalter, Philip Cohen, Holly Figueroa, Eugene Gu, Brandon 
Neely, Joseph Papp, and Nicholas Pappas, are Twitter users who the President 
blocked on Twitter after they had replied to one of the President’s tweets in a 
critical manner.38 They claimed that, by blocking the plaintiffs in response to 
                                                                                                                           
had been exercising authority designated to them by a senior municipal employee), with Columbo v. 
O’Connell, 310 F.3d 115, 118 (2d Cir. 2002) (per curium) (finding no state action where a school official 
hired a private lawyer to draft a letter threatening to sue because the official’s power was not possessed 
by virtue of state law). 
 32 See Halleck, 882 F.3d at 306–07 (first citing Widmar, 545 U.S. at 265–68 (regulation adopted by 
state University’s Board of Curators, prohibiting use of University property for religious reasons); and 
then citing City of Madison, Joint Sch. Dist., 429 U.S. at 169, 176 (order by Wisconsin Employment 
Relation Committee prohibiting school board from allowing teachers to speak on certain topics at public 
meetings)). Significantly, where a court has not yet established the public nature of the forum which 
would lead to an inference of state action, the court must separately identify state action in order to apply 
the public forum doctrine. Id. (citing Widmar, 454 U.S. at 265–68); see City of Madison, Joint Sch. 
Dist., 429 U.S. at 169–76 (indicating that state action is required, although not often explicitly evalu-
ated in public forum analysis). 
 33 Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802. 
 34 See id. (emphasizing that inaction or permissive conduct by the government, in the absence of 
government intent, will not create a nontraditional public forum). 
 35 Id. This intent is more likely to be identified where the nature of the property is compatible with 
expressive activity. See id. at 803 (declining to find intent to create a public forum where property is 
incompatible with expressive activity). Although instruments that can be used for communication may 
be compatible with expressive activity, not every such instrumentality may be considered a public 
forum. Id. 
 36 See Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2251 (declining to find intent to designate a forum and concluding 
that the expressive conduct at issue constituted government speech). 
 37 Knight First Amendment Inst., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 549. The court applied the public forum doctrine 
to evaluate whether the President’s actions constituted permissible government speech or unconstitution-
al viewpoint discrimination within a public forum—the forum being some portion of President Trump’s 
Twitter account. Id. 
 38 Id. at 553. 
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their viewpoints, the President and members of his administration violated the 
plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights by excluding them from a public forum cre-
ated by the President’s Twitter page.39 They argued that this exclusion altered 
the forum in a way that infringed on other participants’ rights as well, because 
those users, including the Knight First Amendment Institute, were left partici-
pating in a forum where certain views had been filtered out.40 
On July 12, 2017, the seven individual plaintiffs, along with the Knight 
First Amendment Institute, filed their complaint against President Trump and 
various White House officials in their official capacity, seeking an injunction 
and declaratory relief.41 The defendants moved for summary judgment on Oc-
tober 13, 2017, following stipulation of facts.42 On November 3, 2017, the 
plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for summary judgment.43 
Ultimately, the court denied the motions in part and granted the motions 
in part, granting only a portion of the defendants’ motion due to issues involv-
ing lack of standing under Article III as to all except President Trump and Mr. 
Scavino.44 In an order issued on May 23, 2018, the court found that the speech 
at issue was political speech protected by the First Amendment.45 The court 
held that the interactive portion of the President’s tweets was appropriately 
analyzed under the public forum doctrine and constituted a designated public 
forum.46 Consequently, the exclusion of the individual plaintiffs infringed on 
their First Amendment rights.47 In partially granting the plaintiffs’ motion for 
                                                                                                                           
 39 Knight Institute v. Trump—Lawsuit Challenging President Trump’s Blocking of Critics on 
Twitter, KNIGHT FIRST AMENDMENT INST., http://knightcolumbia.org/content/knight-institute-v-
trump-lawsuit-challenging-president-trumps-blocking-critics-twitter [https://perma.cc/6ZMX-2HQG] 
[hereinafter Knight Institute v. Trump Lawsuit] (summarizing the lawsuit and the plaintiffs’ argu-
ments). 
 40 Knight First Amendment Inst., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 564; Knight Institute v. Trump Lawsuit, supra 
note 39. 
 41 Knight First Amendment Inst., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 552, 555. The plaintiffs listed the President; 
Daniel Scavino, the White House Social Media Director and Assistant to the President; and Sean 
Spicer, the then-serving White House Press Secretary, as defendants. Id. at 555. When Mr. Spicer 
resigned soon thereafter, his successor, Sarah Huckabee Sanders, and the White House Communica-
tions Director, Hope Hicks, replaced him as defendants in the suit as required by Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 25(d). FED. R. CIV. P. 25(d); Knight First Amendment Inst., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 555. 
 42 Knight First Amendment Inst., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 555. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. at 552, 580. The court found that the plaintiffs did not have standing to sue Ms. Hicks and Ms. 
Sanders, but did have standing to sue the President and Mr. Scavino, who occasionally assisted the Presi-
dent in operating his Twitter account. Id. Because Ms. Sanders did not have access to the account, she 
was dismissed as a defendant for lack of standing. Id. at 580. Hope Hicks was also dismissed as a 
defendant, as she had resigned as White House Communications Director. Id. 
 45 Id. at 541, 564–65. 
 46 Id. at 580. 
 47 Id. 
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summary judgment, the court granted declaratory relief.48 On June 4, 2018, 
President Trump and Mr. Scavino filed a notice of appeal in the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.49 The Second Circuit has calendared 
the case for argument on March 26, 2019.50 
II. PRECEDENT AND KNIGHT FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTE AT  
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY V. TRUMP 
Section A of this Part discusses the factors that courts use to discern 
whether conduct took place in a public forum, or whether the conduct should 
instead be evaluated in the context of government speech.51 Section B discuss-
es the court’s application of the public forum doctrine in Knight First Amend-
ment Institute.52 
A. Compatibility of the Public Forum Analysis 
The fact that members of the public are allowed to visit a place owned or 
operated by the government does not transform that place into a “public fo-
rum” for purposes of the First Amendment.53 Just like a private citizen, the 
state has the power to restrict the use of property it controls to the uses for 
which it was initially intended.54 Thus, courts distinguish between government 
speech and government regulation of private speech, the former of which does 
not fall under the First Amendment’s protection and, consequently, is not sub-
jected to forum analysis.55 
Courts employ various factors to evaluate whether speech is government 
speech.56 First, courts determine whether the potential forum has historically 
                                                                                                                           
 48 Knight First Amendment Inst., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 580. The declaration stated that the President 
had violated the First Amendment by blocking the individual plaintiffs from his Twitter account be-
cause of the political views they expressed. Id. at 579. 
 49 Notice of Appeal at 1, Knight First Amendment Inst., 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) 
(No. 05-5205), ECF No. 73. 
 50 See Argument Calendar, Courtroom 1703, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIR-
CUIT, http://ww2.ca2.uscourts.gov/calendar/index.php?eID=1971 [https://perma.cc/3YT9-B3F7] (set-
ting oral argument in Knight First Amendment Institute v. Trump for Tuesday, March 26, 2019). 
 51 See infra notes 53–65 and accompanying text. 
 52 See infra notes 66–80 and accompanying text. 
 53 Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976). 
 54 Id. 
 55 See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1757 (2017) (declaring that the First Amendment does not 
abridge a government official’s right to free speech and does not govern government speech); see also 
Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 553 (2005) (recognizing that the Government’s 
speech is not subject to First Amendment scrutiny). 
 56 See Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2251 (2015) (“[W]e 
reach this conclusion [of government speech] based on the historical context, observers’ reasonable inter-
pretation of the messages conveyed . . . and the effective control that the State exerts over the design 
selection process.”). 
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been used to express a government message.57 Second, courts evaluate whether 
the public mind would likely closely identify the speech at issue with the gov-
ernment.58 Finally, courts look at the extent of control maintained by the gov-
ernment over the messages conveyed.59 For example, in Pleasant Grove City v. 
Summon, the Supreme Court found that a city had not created a public forum 
by accepting privately donated monuments for a public park, reasoning that 
selecting these monuments was a form of expressive conduct that constituted 
government speech.60 The Court reasoned that governments have long used 
monuments to convey some message to the public, the public mind often views 
monuments as conveying some message on the property owner’s behalf, and 
the ultimate authority of the city to approve the selected monuments effective-
ly controlled the message.61 
If a court finds that the action at issue is not government speech, then a 
forum analysis, and thus classification of the space or property at issue as a 
particular type of forum, is proper.62 Because the government must intend to 
create a designated public forum for one to exist, this classification often in-
volves an evaluation of the government’s intent to either create a forum or en-
gage in government speech.63 Discerning that intent requires a court to evalu-
ate the policy and practice of the government and the nature of the property 
with respect to its compatibility with expressive activity.64 For example, in 
                                                                                                                           
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 See id. (“This authority [over selection] militates against a determination that Texas has created a 
public forum.”); Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 472–73 (2009) (finding display of pri-
vately-donated monuments in public parks is government speech where the city maintained ultimate 
authority over approval of monuments, which allowed the city to effectively control the messages con-
veyed); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 47 (1983) (rejecting that the 
selective access created by requiring permission to access a public school’s internal mail system trans-
formed the mail system into a public forum). 
 60 Pleasant Grove City, 555 U.S. at 480, 481. 
 61 Id. at 470–73. 
 62 Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2250. 
 63 See id. (listing factors used to evaluate intent); Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 
666, 677 (1998) (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985)) (ex-
plaining factors used to discern intent); Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 803 (explaining that courts will not find a 
public forum where evidence clearly indicates an opposing intent). 
 64 Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2250; Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802. A policy or practice that involves granting 
general access to the public as opposed to limiting access by, for example, requiring permission, is con-
sistent with the requisite intent. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 803 (discussing situations where policy in-
volved limiting access as compared to those where access was generally granted and intent was recog-
nized); Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 47 (explaining that requiring permission to access a forum was 
insufficient to create a public forum). In terms of compatibility, where expressive activity would interfere 
with the function of the property, intent will not be found. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 804. For example, 
where plaintiffs sought to create a prisoners’ union, the intent was not identified because the penological 
objectives of a prison and interests of order and stability would be disrupted by allowing associations. Id. 
at 803; Jones, 433 U.S. at 132; see also Michael Kagan, When Immigrants Speak: The Precarious Status 
of Non-Citizen Speech Under the First Amendment, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1237, 1273 (2016) (citing Jones, 
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Widmar v. Vincent, the Supreme Court concluded that a state university had 
displayed the requisite intent to create a public forum where the university had 
an explicit policy of allowing student groups to use its meeting facilities and 
where the university had many characteristics of a traditional public forum, 
making it compatible with expressive activity.65 
B. The Southern District of New York’s Application of the  
Public Forum Doctrine in Knight First Amendment  
Institute at Columbia University v. Trump 
In Knight First Amendment Institute, the court analyzed three aspects of 
President Trump’s Twitter account to identify a potential forum: the content of 
the tweets, the timeline of tweets from his account, and the interactive element 
of his account, with which users could engage through likes, retweets, and re-
plies, as those were the areas that the plaintiffs sought access to.66 The court 
first evaluated the control that President Trump and Mr. Scavino exercised 
over the account and concluded that it was sufficient to meet the public forum 
doctrine’s threshold requirement of ownership or control.67 The court then 
concluded that the content of the tweets was government speech, as the tweets 
were the speech of either the President or an official representing the Presi-
dent.68 The court found that the account’s timeline, which displayed the ac-
count’s tweets, was also government speech, since it simply combines the con-
tent of all tweets sent from the account.69 The court concluded, however, that 
                                                                                                                           
433 U.S. at 125, 129) (discussing Jones and other cases where the legitimate needs and objectives of 
government institutions require restricting speech). 
 65 Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802–03; Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 & n.5 (1981). In contrast, 
in United States v. American Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 205, 208 (2003), the Supreme Court rejected 
application of the public forum doctrine where public libraries blocked certain content from being ac-
cessed on their computers. Daniel W. Park, Government Speech and the Public Forum: A Clash Be-
tween Democratic and Egalitarian Values, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 113, 127 (2010). A plurality of the Court 
explained that libraries were not meant to serve as forums for Internet-content publishers to express 
themselves because the purpose of a publicly-funded library was to facilitate educational and recreational 
endeavors by providing materials and resources. American Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 206; Park, supra, 
at 128. 
 66 Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541, 566, 570 
(S.D.N.Y. 2018). 
 67 Id. at 567. The court found that the control held by the President and Scavino over the content 
of tweets, the timeline of the account, and interactions and engagements of other users with the ac-
count (exercised via blocking) was sufficient to establish ownership or control. Id. at 566–67. The 
court rejected the argument that such ownership or control must stem from authority conferred by law, a 
requirement that the Supreme Court has equated with state action when evaluating civil rights violations 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012); Knight First Amendment Inst., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 
567. 
 68 Knight First Amendment Inst., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 571. 
 69 Id. at 572. 
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the interactive space for likes, replies, and retweets that was created by each 
tweet was not government speech.70 
In evaluating the compatibility of that interactive space with public forum 
analysis, the court looked at the likeliness that the public would associate the 
messages conveyed within this space with those of the President and whether 
the control that the President maintained with respect to those messages was 
instead indicative of government speech.71 After emphasizing the prominence 
of the replying user’s account information in each reply, the court concluded 
that the public mind would probably not closely identify a replying user’s 
tweet with the President, as opposed to the replying user.72 Moreover, the court 
found that the President had no control over the content of replies by non-
blocked users.73 Based on these findings, the court rejected the idea that the 
interactive space associated with each tweet could involve government 
speech.74 
After concluding that public forum analysis was properly applied to the 
interactive portion of the President’s Twitter account, the court attempted to 
classify the space at issue.75 The court found that the interactive space was 
clearly not a traditional public forum, which the Supreme Court has limited to 
its traditional forms.76 The court then considered whether the space could con-
stitute a designated public forum, looking to the factors used to evaluate in-
tent.77 The court concluded that the policy and practice of the government in 
using the account to communicate with the American people, as stipulated by 
Mr. Scavino, and the compatibility of the space with expressive activity, as 
evinced by the interactions it provided for, supported a finding of the requisite 
intent to create a designated public forum.78 The court found that blocking the 
individual plaintiffs was viewpoint discrimination—evidenced by the fact that 
the President blocked them after each had criticized the President—and con-
cluded that the President violated the plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights.79 The 
                                                                                                                           
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Knight First Amendment Inst., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 571–72. The court highlighted the fact that the 
interactive space of each tweet is not constrained by selectivity or scarcity, which indicates a large degree 
of control and counsels against finding a public forum. Id. at 572–73. 
 75 Id. at 573. 
 76 Id. (citing Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n, 523 U.S. at 678). Parks and streets, for example, are 
forms of traditional public forums. Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45 (quoting Hague v. Comm. for 
Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)). 
 77 Id. at 574. These factors include the policy and practice and the nature of the property with 
respect to its compatibility with expressive activity. Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2250; Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 
802. 
 78 See Knight First Amendment Inst., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 574, 575. 
 79 Id. The court discussed an alternative action that the President could have taken: “muting.” Id. at 
576. Muting an individual allows a user to remove that account’s tweets from his or her timeline without 
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court concluded that, despite the fact that a blocked user can still access the 
President’s tweets and reply to others who have replied to the tweets, the harm 
resulting from restricting even a small degree of speech was enough to justify 
relief and led the court to grant declaratory relief.80 
III. AN INAPPROPRIATE APPLICATION OF THE PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE 
This Part argues that United States District Court for the Southern District 
of New York inappropriately applied the public forum doctrine and should 
have instead classified the President’s conduct as government speech.81 Sec-
tion A of this Part argues that the court’s failure to separately identify state ac-
tion was inappropriate, because doing so would have made it clear that the 
First Amendment should not be applied to the President’s conduct on his Twit-
ter account.82 Section B argues that the President’s actions are more consistent 
with the government speech doctrine when evaluated in light of the nature and 
purpose of that doctrine.83 Section C argues that the court’s application of the 
factors used to discern government speech was erroneous and that correct ap-
plication favors a finding of government speech.84 
A. Distinguishing the President’s Twitter Control 
The court improperly refused to consider the ownership or control held by 
the President in the context of state action.85 In response to the defendants’ ar-
gument that such consideration was required, the court simply pointed to a 
statement by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals explaining that it is typically 
unnecessary.86 The Second Circuit had explained that, because a public forum 
is typically operated by the government, determining that a space constitutes a 
public forum makes separately establishing state action, in addition to estab-
                                                                                                                           
unfollowing or blocking that account. Id. Thus, while replies to or mentions of the President’s account 
would not result in the President receiving those notifications, the muted account may still engage with 
the interactive space of the President’s tweets. Id. 
 80 Id. at 577. The court was hesitant to impose injunctive relief and instead granted declaratory 
relief, relying on the Supreme Court’s direction that a President is likely to abide by an authoritative 
interpretation of the Constitution. Id. at 579 (citing Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 803 (1992)). 
 81 See infra notes 85–106 and accompanying text. 
 82 See infra notes 85–93 and accompanying text. 
 83 See infra notes 94–97 and accompanying text. 
 84 See infra notes 98–106 and accompanying text. 
 85 See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541, 568 
(S.D.N.Y. 2018) (refusing to separately identify state action in evaluating control); Rinehart, supra 
note 8, at 816 (discussing the difficulty in reconciling the ability to block other users with classifica-
tion of Twitter as a public forum). 
 86 See Knight First Amendment Inst., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 568 (citing Halleck v. Manhattan Cmty. 
Access Corp., 882 F.3d 300, 306–07 (2d Cir. 2018)) (declining to evaluate state action in light of the 
Second Circuit’s remarks in Halleck). 
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lishing government ownership or control, unnecessary.87 In relying on that 
statement, the court failed to consider the fact that the Second Circuit’s explana-
tion referred to a situation where a public forum had already been identified.88 
In contrast, the court did not attempt to classify the forum until after con-
cluding that the analysis was appropriate, making an inference of state action 
inappropriate.89 The court’s failure to require state action was a flawed leap, as 
First Amendment protections and the public forum doctrine cannot be applied 
without state action.90 President Trump’s control over the interactive space asso-
ciated with his Twitter page, which he demonstrates by blocking other users, 
stems not from his official capacity as a public official or through any rules im-
posed by the state, but rather from his capacity as a Twitter user.91 Although 
plausible that the President’s assumption of office may have changed the nature 
of his Twitter account, the President’s choice to continue using his personal ac-
count rather than the designated presidential Twitter account is telling of his con-
trary intentions.92 Consequently, that control alone cannot establish state ac-
tion.93 
                                                                                                                           
 87 Id. 
 88 See id. (discussing Second Circuit’s explanation and declining to separately identify state ac-
tion). The court’s argument is further weakened by the fact that the Second Circuit explicitly identified 
state action in that case. See Halleck, 882 F.3d at 306–07 (finding connection between governmental 
authority and actors sufficient to establish that actors are state actors, and explaining that decision rests on 
finding appropriate “statutory, regulatory, and contractual framework” to apply the First Amendment). 
 89 See Knight First Amendment Inst., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 573 (concluding that forum analysis is 
proper and subsequently determining the forum’s classification). 
 90 See Halleck, 882 F.3d at 306–07 (discussing the requirement of state action); see also Lehman v. 
City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 303–04 (1974) (applying the First Amendment “[b]ecause state 
action exists”); Grogan v. Blooming Grove Volunteer Ambulance Corps, 768 F.3d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 
2014) (requiring litigant alleging constitutional rights violations to first establish state action). 
 91 See Grogan, 768 F.3d at 263–64 (defining state action); Columbo v. O’Connell, 310 F.3d 115, 117 
(2d Cir. 2002) (rejecting claim where official was not acting under color of state law); Knight First 
Amendment Inst., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 552 (discussing President Trump’s use of Twitter). 
 92 See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46–47 (1983) (explaining 
that the government is free to alter the open character of a public forum and declining to find a public 
forum based on past use of the forum at issue); Knight First Amendment Inst., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 552 
(discussing ability to close a designated public forum); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), 
TWITTER, https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump [https://perma.cc/4HYU-EDLC] (“Joined March 
2009.”). For an example of President Trump’s limited use of the official Presidential Twitter account, 
see President Trump (@POTUS), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/potus [https://perma.cc/VWH6-
6B9R]. 
 93 See Grogan, 768 F.3d at 263–64 (quoting Cranley v. Nat’l Life Ins. Co. of Vt., 318 F.3d 105, 111 
(2d Cir. 2003)) (“To demonstrate state action, a plaintiff must establish both that her . . . ‘deprivation 
[was] caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct im-
posed by the State . . . , and that the party charged with the deprivation [is] a . . . state actor.’”). 
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B. President Trump’s Incompatibility with the Public Forum Analysis 
The purpose of the government speech doctrine supports the conclusion 
that public forum analysis is out of place in the context of President Trump’s 
Twitter.94 The purpose of the government speech doctrine is to allow the gov-
ernment to clearly express its messages, which can be done through the exclu-
sion of alternative viewpoints and through private speakers.95 President Trump’s 
actions indicate an assertion of his right to express disagreement with those users 
and a desire to prevent them from engaging in conversation with him.96 Moreo-
ver, doing so relates to the nature of politics, which should be valued in light of 
the significant role that government speech plays in our political democracy.97 
C. An Erroneous Application of Government Speech Factors 
The court’s finding of a designated public forum relied on an incorrect 
evaluation of the factors typically applied to differentiate between government 
speech and impermissible discrimination within a public forum.98 First, the 
court seemed to conclude that, because Twitter has a limited historical context, 
evaluation of the historical element was unnecessary.99 The President has con-
sistently used his Twitter account to express his own views to the public, which 
favors government speech and makes failure to consider this historical context 
                                                                                                                           
 94 See Park, supra note 65, at 130 (explaining that government’s approval of a message, explicitly 
or implicitly, is a key indicator of government speech); Rinehart, supra note 8, at 807 (explaining that 
the government speech doctrine allows the government to exclude alternative views to ensure clear 
conveyance of the government’s message). 
 95 See Park, supra note 65, at 131 (explaining that the government’s solicitation of the assistance of 
nongovernmental sources to convey a specific message does not preclude government speech); Rinehart, 
supra note 8, at 808 (citing Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001)) (“Notably, the 
Velazquez Court reasoned that the government speech doctrine exists to ensure that the government can 
speak clearly and without distortion.”). 
 96 See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467–68 (2009) (emphasizing a governmental 
entity’s right to speak for itself); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991) (rejecting that the Govern-
ment engages in unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination by choosing to fund a program that aims to 
advance some permissible end, even if it discourages alternative goals). 
 97 See Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2246 (2015) (ex-
plaining that the government would not be able to function if the Free Speech Clause were interpreted to 
apply to government speech); Pleasant Grove City, 555 U.S. at 468 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“It is the 
very business of government to favor and disfavor points of view.”)). Disagreement with an official’s 
government speech should be addressed in the electoral process, rather than through expansion of the 
public forum doctrine. See Corbin, supra note 8, at 615 (“Politicians are, after all, elected because 
they advocate particular viewpoints, and governments need to engage in viewpoint discrimination in 
order to act.”). 
 98 See Wandering Dago, Inc. v. Destito, 879 F.3d 20, 34 (2d Cir. 2018) (citing Walker, 135 S. Ct. 
at 2247–48) (listing and applying factors); Knight First Amendment Inst., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 572 
(evaluating interactive space). 
 99 See Knight First Amendment Inst., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 569 (rejecting as persuasive the argument 
that Trump’s establishment of his Twitter account in 2009, prior to his presidency). 
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substantial.100 Next, the court incorrectly concluded that the President’s control 
over the interactive space created by his tweets was insufficiently direct to in-
dicate government speech.101 While the President has no control over messages 
expressed on individual users’ accounts, he does maintain control over the 
connection between these messages and his own account, which he exerts 
through blocking.102 Significantly, by interacting with the President’s tweets, 
Twitter users can alter the meaning and interpretations of those tweets, either 
by adding to the context of the tweet or distorting the original message con-
veyed by it.103 Consequently, blocking users in response to messages that the 
President does not want associated with his account is a legitimate and clear 
display of government speech.104 Finally, the court inappropriately concluded 
that the public mind would not associate the President with the replies of users 
to his tweets.105 Although the replies in isolation may be most directly associ-
ated with the replying user, within the interactive space, these replies are all 
linked to the President’s account, so one would generally associate that entire 
space with the President.106 
                                                                                                                           
 100 See Terry Collins, Trump’s Itchy Twitter Thumbs Have Redefined Politics, CNET (Jan. 20, 
2018), https://www.cnet.com/news/donald-trump-twitter-redefines-presidency-politics/ [https://perma.
cc/NU9U-CRUC] (describing the President’s response to criticism as retaliation “by doubling down 
on his virtual megaphone: Twitter”). President Trump’s embrace of his Twitter account to prevent 
distortion of his messages by the media supports that his intent is to express views to the public himself 
and not to designate a public forum. See Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 6, 
2017, 7:48 AM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/872059997429022722 [https://perma.cc/
K2KH-QP2L] (“The FAKE MSM [(mainstream media)] is working so hard trying to get me not to 
use Social Media. They hate that I can get the honest and unfiltered message out.”). 
 101 See Knight First Amendment Inst., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 572 (evaluating control); see also Rine-
hart, supra note 8, at 817 (suggesting that regulating who responds to tweets may be sufficient control 
over the message to indicate government speech). 
 102 See Knight First Amendment Inst., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 572; How to Block Accounts on Twitter, 
TWITTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/using-twitter/blocking-and-unblocking-accounts [https://perma.
cc/BVQ5-K2K7]; see also Rinehart, supra note 8, at 816 (discussing difficulty in reconciling ability 
to block users with classification of Twitter as a public forum). For a discussion of the government’s 
ability to select one view over another to convey its own message, see Bezanson & Buss, supra note 
8, at 1407. 
 103 See Rinehart, supra note 8, at 789 (discussing ability of Twitter users to alter the meanings and 
interpretations of other users’ tweets). 
 104 Id. Notably, it is not uncommon for Twitter users to block individuals who respond to their tweets 
negatively. See How to Block Accounts on Twitter, supra note 102 (explaining to Twitter users how to 
block the accounts of others); cf. Pleasant Grove City, 555 U.S. at 471 (rationalizing finding govern-
ment speech by noting that it is uncommon for property owners to allow messages they do not agree with 
to be conveyed on their property). 
 105 See Knight First Amendment Inst., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 572 (concluding that the public is un-
likely to associate replies to the President’s tweets with the President and basing conclusion on the 
prominence with which a user’s account information appears in a reply tweet). 
 106 See Using Twitter, TWITTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/using-twitter [https://perma.cc/N8F7-
KYUU] (providing links to information about various aspects of Twitter); About Replies and Men-
tions, TWITTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/using-twitter/mentions-and-replies [https://perma.cc/
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CONCLUSION 
In Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University v. Trump, the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York incorrectly 
applied public forum analysis to President Trump’s Twitter account. The Presi-
dent’s “blocking” of Twitter users, while arguably viewpoint discrimination, 
does not violate the First Amendment. Moreover, careful analysis of the factors 
used to evaluate whether an official’s conduct constitutes government speech 
indicates that President Trump’s conduct was exactly that. In light of the large 
role that government speech plays in our political democracy, failure to identify 
the President’s actions as government speech was inappropriate. 
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3UU3-JNRR] (explaining that the message “Replying to . . .” appears in replies to tweets and that 
clicking on a reply in a user’s timeline causes the tweet to which the user replied to be displayed). 
